Dangerous Products and Injured Bystanders by Cochran, Robert F., Jr.
Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 81 | Issue 3 Article 5
1993
Dangerous Products and Injured Bystanders
Robert F. Cochran Jr.
Pepperdine University
Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Consumer Protection Law Commons
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits
you.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal
by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.
Recommended Citation
Cochran, Robert F. Jr. (1993) "Dangerous Products and Injured Bystanders," Kentucky Law Journal: Vol. 81 : Iss. 3 , Article 5.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol81/iss3/5
Dangerous Products and Injured
Bystanders
BY ROBERT F. COCHRAN, JR.*
Table of Contents
INTRODUCTION ................................ 688
I. THE BYSTANDER: NEGLECTED VICTIM OF PRODUCTS
LmzmrrY .................................... 690
A. The Warranty Roots of Products Liability
and the Assault on the Privity Citadel ............. 690
B. Remnants of the Privity Citadel ................. 692
1. The Consumer Expectation Test ............... 692
2. The Inherent Characteristics Rule ............. 693
3. The Patent Danger Rule .................... 699
II. BYSTANDER RECOVERY FOR INJURY FROM NONDEFECTIVE
DANGEROUS PRODUCTS .......................... 700
A. Fairness and the Bystander .................... 701
1. Unreciprocated Risk ....................... 701
2. No Benefit from the Product or Any of Its
Cost Savings ............................. 704
B. Spreading the Risk of Bystander Injury: Court-
Imposed Third Party Insurance .................. 705
C. Safety, Efficiency, and Internalizing the Cost
of Bystander Injury .......................... 707
D. Abnormally Dangerous Activity Liability as
Precedent for Bystander Recovery ................ 715
E. Dangerous Products that Create Risks to
Bystanders ................................ 720
1. Second-Hand Tobacco Smoke ................ 720
* Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of Law. B.A. 1973, Carson-Newman College;
J.D. 1976, University of Virginia.
I would like to thank Ken Abraham, Bob Brain, Rick Cupp, Carl Hawkins, Saul Levmore,
David Logan, John Noyes, David Owen, Mark Scarberry, Gary Schwartz, Peter Wendel and Paul
Zwier for their comments on earlier drafts. I would also like to thank Sally Campbell, Steven Carter
and Roger Fredrickson for their able research assistance.
688 KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 81
2. Alcohol-Related Accidents ................... 722
3. Firearms ............................... 723
CONCLUSION .................................. 725
INTRODUCTION
Dangerous products injure two distinct categories of people:
consumers and bystanders. Products liability law has been dominated by
concern for the consumer. Courts have often placed greater limitations on
bystander recovery than on consumer recovery, but several factors may
justify extending a broader right of recovery to bystanders than to
consumers.' Unlike consumers, bystanders generally do not benefit from
the product do not benefit from any cost savings that a dangerous
product design creates, have had no opportunity to bargain for greater
safety, have had no opportunity to determine the dangers of the product,
and have not chosen to expose themselves to the dangerous characteristics
of the product.
Products liability law has failed to recognize these differences
between consumers and bystanders. Many of the limitations on recovery
in strict products liability law are based on its warranty roots,2 and may
not be justified when the plaintiff is a bystander. These limitations
include the consumer expectations test,3 the inherent characteristics rule,4
and the patent danger rule.5 Even the requirement that the plaintiff
establish that the product is defective may be a function of products
liability law's consumer focus. When the injured plaintiff is a consumer,
these limitations may be justified. There is, however, substantially less
justification for these limitations when the injured party is a bystander,
' As the California Supreme Court urged in Elmore v. American Motors Corp., 451 P.2d 84,
89 (Cal. 1969), one of the first cases to allow bystander recovery in strict products liability:
If anything, bystanders should be entitled to greater protection than the consumer or
user where injury to bystanders from the defect is reasonably foreseeable. Consumers and
users, at least, have the opportunity to inspect for defects and to limit their purchases to
articles manufactured by reputable manufacturers and sold by reputable retailers, where
as the bystander ordinarily has no such opportunities. In short, the bystander is in greater
need of protection from defective products which are dangerous, and if any distinction
should be made between bystanders and users, it should be made, contrary to the position
of defendants, to extend greater liability in favor of the bystanders.
Id.
'During the early stages of strict products liability in tort, there was some doubt as to whether
injured bystanders would be entitled to any recovery, but courts have now generally placed
bystanders on an equal footing with consumers. See cases cited brfru note 25.
See infra text accompanying notes 30-32.
See infra text accompanying notes 33-56.
See infra text accompanying notes 57-66.
BYSTANDER RECOVERY
and several good reasons for allowing recovery. This Article will
consider the directions in which strict products liability law may
expand if freed from its consumer focus, including the possibility that
courts might allow bystanders to recover for injuries from dangerous,
but nondefective, products.6
When a bystander is injured by a nondefective, dangerous product
that a substantial portion of the population does not use, the case for
recovery from the manufacturer of the product is probably the
strongest. Manufacturers and consumers who create a market for such
products subject bystanders to unreciprocated risks, i.e., risks to which
bystanders do not expose manufacturers and consumers.' Imposing
liability in such cases would compensate bystanders for their losses
and spread the costs of such injury to the consumers who help to
create the risk.'
If bystanders do not recover for their injuries, these losses are
external costs-the losses are not included in the cost of the products
and do not affect the decisions of manufacturers and consumers.
These external costs create economic inefficiency. If courts imposed
liability, the cost of bystander injury would be ifternalized in the cost
of the products, and the price would more accurately reflect the costs
that they create This would place pressure on manufacturers to take
cost-justified safety steps.
The argument is not that the risks of dangerous products outweigh
their benefits. Explosives, guns, cigarettes, alcohol, snowmobiles, power
boats and all-terrain vehicles serve important purposes. Nevertheless,
manufacturers and, through them, those who purchase dangerous
products, should bear the risk that those products pose to others.
When a bystander is injured by a dangerous product, abnormally
dangerous activity liability may be a more appropriate precedent for
courts to look to than warranty law. Courts developed warranty law in
cases involving purchasers and consumers; they developed abnormally
dangerous activity liability in cases involving injured bystanders and
' Professors James Henderson and Aaron Twerski make a strong argument that courts will not
and should not extend liability to manufacturers of nondefective products. See James A. Henderson
& Aaron Twerski, Closing the American Products Liability Frontier: The Rejection of Liability
Without Defect, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1263 (1991). This Article will suggest that the arguments against
extending recovery for injury from nondefective dangerous products are substantially weaker in cases
of bystander injury, and that there are significant justifications for extending recovery to bystanders.
For a discussion of Professors Henderson and Twerski's arguments, see infra text accompanying notes
111-21.
'See infra text accompanying notes 70-77.
'See infra text accompanying notes 79-88.
'See infra text accompanying notes 89-121.
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defendants who benefit from dangerous activity.'° In both the
abnormally dangerous activity cases and the dangerous product cases,
the plaintiffs are injured bystanders and the defendants are parties that
benefit from activity that puts the bystanders at risk.
Part I of this Article discusses the limitations that products
liability law has placed on bystander recovery. Part -II explores
whether courts should impose strict liability on manufacturers of dangerous,
but nondefective, products for bystander injury. Part II also examines the
possibility of applying such a rule to manufacturers of cigarettes, alcohol
and firearms.
I. THE BYSTANDER: NEGLECTED VICTIM OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY
A. The Warranty Roots of Products Liability and the Assault on the
Privity Citadel
The question of whether manufacturers would be subject to liability
for bystander injury first arose under a negligence theory. Courts initially
denied bystanders the right to recover from manufacturers that negligently
caused them injury; plaintiffs had to show that they were in privity with
the manufacturer."' Justice Cardozo, however, rejected the privity
limitation in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.2 Other jurisdictions
quickly followed, and today injured bystanders can recover against
negligent manufacturers.
Strict products liability initially developed as a warranty cause of
action. 4 Whereas the privity limitation made little sense in a negligence
cause of action, the limitation has some justification in a warranty cause
of action. The warranty cause of action is based on the theory that a
defect in the product violates an express or implied warranty between the
manufacturer and the purchaser. 5 Initially, only the purchaser could
bring a warranty cause of action. 6 In 1960, in Henningsen v. Bloomfield
Motors, Inc.,7 the New Jersey Supreme Court extended warranty protection
io See infra text accompanying notes 122-39.
The classic case is Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402, 404 (H.L. 1842). Although
Winterbottom involved injury to a user, rather than a bystander, it established the privity doctrine that
barred bystanders from recovery.
12 111 N.E. 1050, 1054 (N.Y. 1916).
" The MacPherson decision "found immediate acceptance, and at the end of some forty years
is universal law in the United States.... W. PAGE KETroN Er AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE
LAW oF TORTS § 96, at 683 (5th ed. 1984) (footnote omitted).
" See William L. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Sbct Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN.
L. R.V. 791, 800 (1966).
" KEzrON Er AL., supra note 13, § 95A, at 679.
"Id. § 97, at 690-91.
" 161 A.2d 69 (NJ. 1960).
[Vol. 81
1992-93] BYSTANDER RECOVERY
to the wife of the purchaser of an automobile.18 Today most states have
extended bystander recovery in a warranty cause of action to one "who is in
the family or household of [the] buyer or who is a guest in his home."19
Beginning in the early 1960s, the Restatement (Second) of Torts and
most courts recognized a strict products liability cause of action sounding in
tortC0 Manufacturers became subject to strict liability for injuries that their
defective products cause. The Restatement acknowledged that strict liability
in tort evolved from warranty law2 and that courts had not "gone
beyond allowing recovery to users and consumers."'  The Restatement,
however, took no position as to whether bystanders should be allowed to
recover under strict liability in tort. Though several courts initially denied
recovery in strict liability to bystanders,24 most courts have rejected a privity
,Id. at 81.
,U.C.C. § 2-318 (1987); JAMES J. WHr & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE § 11-2, at 457 (3d ed. 1988).
" See g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., 377 P.2d 897, 900 (Cal. 1963) ("A manufacturer
is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the market, knowing that it is to be used without
inspection for defects, proves to have a defect which causes injury to a human being."); RESrATE-
MENr (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1977) (approved by the American Law Institute in 1964).
To recover in strict products liability, a plaintiff must show that the product is defective.
Plaintiff's theory may be that the product was defectively manufactured, had a defective warning or
had a defective design. Under a manufacturing defect theory, plaintiffs must show that the product
turned out differently than the manufacturer intended. In rniswarning cases, the plaintiff must show
that the product failed to include a reasonable warning, in light of what the manufacturer knew or
should have known.
In design defect cases, most jurisdictions have adopted either a consumer expectations test, a
benefit/risk test, or some combination of the two. Under the consumer expectations test, the plaintiff
must show that the product was more dangerous than the ordinary consumer would have expected.
See infra note 35 and accompanying text. Under the benefit/risk test, a product is defective if its costs
outweigh its benefits. Some courts, in strict products liability cases, consider not the risk that the
manufacturer knew or should have known at the time of manufacture, as in negligence cases, but the
risk that is known at some time after manufacture, either at the time of sale, see John J. Wade, On
the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 MIss. L.J. 825, 834 (1973), or the time of trial,
see W. Page Keeton, Product Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 30, 38 (1973).
In Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 456 (Cal. 1978), the California Supreme Court allowed
the plaintiff to use either the benefit/risk test or the consumer expectations test and as to the
benefit/risk test, placed the burden on the defendant to show that the burden of using an alternative
design was greater than the risks of the product. The Supreme Court of Alaska adopted the Barker
approach in Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 884 (Alaska 1979).
1 Comment b to Section 402A of the Restatement discusses the history of strict products
liability:.
In later years the courts have become more or less agreed upon the theory of a "warranty"
from the seller to the consumer [as the basis of products liability], either "running with
the goods" by analogy to a covenant running with the land, or made directly to the
consumer.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cn. b (1977).
Id. § 402A cmt. o, at 356.
Id. at 357.
See William L. Prosser, Strict Products Liability and the Bystander, 64 CoL. L. REV. 916, 916
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limitation in strict products liability and have placed bystanders on an
equal footing with consumers.s The remainder of this Article considers
whether bystanders should be preferred to consumers in strict products
liability cases.
B. Remnants of the Privity Citadel
Though courts purport to have done away with the privity require-
ment in strict products liability, they continue to limit the rights of
bystanders with rules that are based on warranty law's purchaser/seller
relationship. These rules include: (1) the consumer expectations test,
under which a product is defectively designed only if it is more danger-
ous than the ordinary consumer would expect;26 (2) the inherent charac-
teristics rule, under which a product is not defective if the dangerous
aspect of the product is one of its inherent characteristics;27 and (3) the
patent danger rule, under which some states hold that a manufacturer is
not liable if the dangerous aspect of the product is obvious to the
consumer.28 Though these rules make sense in a products liability cause
of action brought by a purchaser or consumer, they are not justified in a
cause of action brought by a bystander. As was said of earlier limitations
on bystander recovery, these rules are "the distorted shadow of a
vanishing privity which is itself a reflection of the habit of viewing the
problem as a commercial one between traders, rather than as part of the
accident problem."' This section discusses each of these rules, and
concludes that they should not limit bystander recovery.
1. The Consumer Expectations Test
Under the Restatement (Second) of Torts, to show that a product is
defectively designed, a plaintiff must show that the product is dangerous
beyond the expectations of the ordinary consumer." Thus, if the
n.3 (1964) (discussing cases denying bystander recovery in strict products liability).
' See, &g., Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 626 F.2d 280, 288 (3d
Cir. 1980) (applying Illinois law); Passwaters v. General Motors Corp., 454 F.2d 1270, 1274 (8th Cir.
1972) (applying Iowa law); Wasik v. Borg, 423 F.2d 44, 47 (2d Cir. 1970) (applying Vermont law);
Elmore v. American Motors Corp., 451 P.2d 84, 88 (Cal. 1969); Haunersen v. Ford Motor Co., 257
N.W.2d 7, 16 (Iowa 1977); Ethicon, Inc. v. Parten, 520 S.W.2d 527, 533 (Tex. Ct. App. 1975);
Howes v. Hansen, 201 N.W.2d 825, 828 (Wis. 1972).
See infra text accompanying notes 29-32.
See infra text accompanying notes 33-55.
See infra text accompanying notes 57-66.
2 FOWLER J. HARPER & FLEMING JAMES, JR., THE LAW OF TORTS § 28.16, at 1572 n.6
(1956).
A manufacturer is subject to strict liability under 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
[Vol. 81
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ordinary consumer is aware of the danger posed by a product, the
manufacturer is not subject to liability. This is basically the same test that
is applied under the Uniform Commercial Code's implied warranty of
merchantability.31
When purchasers or consumers of a product sue the manufacturer, it
may be appropriate to limit their right to recover to the extent that the
ordinary consumer would have understood the risks created by the
product. The consumer has had the opportunity to inspect the product for
safety and has benefited from any cost savings or other benefits of the
design. It is difficult, however, to see why the expectations of the
ordinary consumer should limit bystander recovery. Bystanders have no
ability to check the product for safety and do not benefit from the
product's function nor from any cost savings resulting from the product's
design.32
2. The Inherent Characteristics Rule
Many jurisdictions prohibit courts from imposing strict liability on the
manufacturer of a dangerous product when the dangerous aspect of the
product is one of its inherent characteristics.33 Under this rule, a
if the product is "in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his
property." REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1977). Comment i to Section 402A states:
"The article sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the
ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowlege common to the community as to
its characteristics." Id. § 402A cmt. i.
" U.C.C. § 2-314 (1987). Under section 2-314 of the Uniform Commercial Code, sale of a
product by a merchant carries with it an implied warranty of merchantability. A warranty of
merchantability was also implied under the Uniform Sales Act. Uniform Sales Act § 15(2) (1906).
The test for merchantability appears to be the same as the consumer expectations test that is applied
in strict products liability in tort cases. A product is merchantable if it would "pass without objection
in the trade under the contract description.' U.C.C. § 2-314(2). This standard looks to the
expectations of those in the trade, which would be the same as the expectations of the ordinary
consumer, unless the expectations of consumers and producers in the trade differed. White and
Summers report that in most cases in which courts have found breaches of the warranty of
merchantability, the products "either did not work properly or were unexpectedly harmfl." WHrrH
& SUMMERS, supra note 19, at 412.
White and Summers further acknowledge that, except for the fact that the strict products liability
portion of the Restatement does not normally apply to economic losses, a breach of the warranty of
merchantability under the U.C.C. and a defect under section 402A of the Restatement are "nearly
synonymous" and they "would expect a court to hold that any automobile which was not
merchantable was also in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous." Id. at 416.
" A later section of this Article considers whether courts should allow injured bystanders to
recover from manufacturers of dangerous products without requiring them to show that the product
is defective. See infra text accompanying notes 68-142.
" See. eg., Delvaux v. Ford Motor Co., 764 F.2d 469, 474 (7th Cir. 1985) (applying Wisconsin
law); Kelley v. R.G. Indus., 497 A.2d 1143, 1148 (Md. Ct. App. 1985); Pemberton v. American
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manufacturer is not subject to liability, no matter how great the inherent
risks of a product. In order to recover, plaintiffs must show that the
product could have been designed in a safer manner.' Courts and
commentators have interpreted comment i to section 402A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts as advocating the inherent characteristics
rule.35 The recent Reporters' Study on Enterprise Responsibility for
Personal Injury prepared for the American Law Institute (the body that
adopts the Restatements) also appears to advocate the inherent character-
istics rule."
Several justifications may underlie the inherent characteristics rule.
First, when consumers are aware of a product's inherently dangerous
characteristics, they have chosen to expose themselves to such risks and
it may be that they should bear the responsibility for the losses they
Distilled Spirits, 664 S.W.2d 690, 692 (Tenn. 1984). Contra O'Brienv. Muskin Corp., 463 A.2d 298,
304-05 (N.J. 1983); Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 447 A.2d 539, 545 (N.J. 1982); cf.
Kotler v. American Tobacco Co., 926 F.2d 1217, 1224-25 (1st Cir. 1990) (applying inherent
characteristics rule to a warranty claim against cigarette manufacturer), vacated, 112 S. CL 3019
(1992).
' See, e.g., Kotler, 926 F.2d at 1225; Colter v. Barber-Greene Co., 525 N.E.2d 1305, 1310-11
(Mass. 1988); Uloth v. City Tank Corp., 384 N.E.2d 1188, 1193 (Mass. 1978).
Comment i states:
i. Unreasonably dangerous. [Strict products liability] applies only where the defective
condition of the product makes it unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer. Many
products cannot possibly be made entirely safe for all consumption, and any food or drug
necessarily involves some risk of harm, if only from over-consumption. Ordinary sugar
is a deadly poison to diabetics, and castor oil found use under Mussolini as an instrument
of torture. That is not what is meant by "unreasonably dangerous" in this Section. The
article sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated
by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the
community as to its characteristics. Good whiskey is not unreasonably dangerous merely
because it will make some people drunk, and is especially dangerous to alcoholics; but
bad whiskey, containing a dangerous amount of fusel oil, is unreasonably dangerous.
Good tobacco is not unreasonably dangerous merely because the effects of smoking may
be harmful; but tobacco containing something like marijuana may be unreasonably
dangerous. Good butter is not unreasonably dangerous merely because, if such be the
case, it deposits cholesterol in the arteries and leads to heart attacks; but bad butter,
contaminated with poisonous fish oil, is unreasonably dangerous.
RESrATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. i (1977). Though comment i suggests that the
nondefective products listed in it are merely examples of products that have risks that are not
beyond the expectations of the ordinary consumer, William Prosser, the Reporter of the Second
Restatement, interpreted comment i to mean that strict liability will not be imposed on the
manufacturers of products that have inherently dangerous characteristics unless the danger is
unreasonable. William L. Prosser, Strict Liability to the Consumer in California, 18 HAsINoS L.J.
9, 23 (1966); see also Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 501 P.2d 1153, 1161 (Cal. 1972) (citing Prosser
for the proposition that a manufacturer is not strictly liable for all the harm his product could do
as a result of its inherently dangerous characteristics unless such danger is unreasonable).
SAMERICAN LAw INSTTUTE REPORTE&S' STUDY, 2 EnTERPRISE RESPONSIBILrrY FOR PERSONAL
INiURY 48-56 (1991) [hereinafter ErERPimSE RESPONSIBILrrY].
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incur. Consumer responsibility may be at the root of comment i to section
402A of the Restatement. Comment i provides four examples of products
with inherent dangers that it suggests should not subject the manufacturer
to strict liability: sugar, whiskey, tobacco, and butter.' These products
all expose consumers to risks of which consumers are commonly aware.
Even when comment i mentions alcohol, a product that creates great and
obvious risks to bystanders, it mentions only the risks to the drinker:
"Good whiskey is not unreasonably dangerous merely because it will
make some people drunk, and is especially dangerous to alcoholics
° 38
If consumers are or should be aware of the risks of a product, it may
be reasonable to deny them recovery.39 The loss is arguably their
responsibility.4 The consumer's assumption of inherent risks, however,
does not justify limiting the recovery of bystanders. The knowledge of the
consumer should have no effect on the bystander's ability to recover for
losses sustained.
Dean William Prosser has suggested a second justification for the
inherent characteristics rule. According to Prosser, comment i was added
to the Restatement to foreclose the possibility that the manufacturer of
products with an inherent risk of harm, such as sugar, whiskey, tobacco,
and butter, would be held "automatically responsible for all the harm that
such things do in the world."' Such responsibility would be too costly
for manufacturers of such products to bear. In light of the developments
that have taken place in products liability law, however, Prosser's concern
was unjustified. For instance, even if courts reject the inherent character-
istics rule, the defect requirement and defenses based on the plaintiff's
conduct would greatly limit the responsibility of manufacturers for their
products' inherent risks.42 If courts were to reject the inherent character-
See supra note 35 (quoting in full RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. i (1977)).
"REsATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 403A cmt. i (1977).
,In negligence actions, the law traditionally denied recovery on this basis through the
contributory negligence and assumption of the risk defenses. PpossFR & KEErON, supra note 13, §
68, at 481-82.
Some of the defenses that strict products liability law recognizes also limit recovery based on
the plaintiff's responsibility. Some jurisdictions deny recovery if the plaintiff is both negligent and
assumes the risk, while others apply comparative fault. Id. § 102, at 711-12.
See David G. Owen, The Moral Foundations of Products Liability: Toward First Principles,
68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 1993) (manuscript at 75-76, on file with the KENTUCKY LAW
JOURNAL).
" Prosser, supra note 35, at 23; see also Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 501 P.2d 1153, 1162
(Cal. 1972) ("Although the seller should not be responsible for all injuries involving the use of its
products, it should be held liable for all injuries proximately caused by any of its products which are
adjudged 'defective.").
"Z Butter and sugar would not be defective under either the consumer expectations or benefit/risk
1992-93]
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istics rule in cases of bystander injury, as advocated herein,43 this would
create a much smaller extension of liability than if courts rejected the
inherent characteristics rule in all cases.
The final argument in favor of the inherent characteristics rule is that
if the consumer is aware of the risks that accompany a product, courts
should defer to the consumer's decision that the benefits of a product are
greater than its risks. The rationale for this is that the consumer is in a
better position than a jury to balance the benefits and risks of a prod-
uct." For example, the American Law Institute Reporters' Study states:
The risk-utility [defect test, without an inherent characteristics
limitation] apparently permits juries to over-rule buyers when deciding
whether a product has sufficient social utility. This is an error because
a product has sufficient social utility if informed consumers are willing
to purchase it given its costs, including accident costs.
Under these circumstances the appropriate decision maker is the
buyer, not the jury. An open-ended risk-utility test, however, permits
juries in adjudicating the legality of designs to presume that necessities
provide more social utility than luxuries. In fact, the value of a
particular product design is typically measured by the consumers'
willingness to pay. for the product so designed; so when consumers are
adequately informed about risks, tort law should rely on markets to
decide what product designs should be produced.4
This argument is valid only to the extent a product creates risks
solely to the consumer. In the bystander cases, however, such deference
to consumer choice carries with it the same problems as the consumer
expectations test.46 It may be that informed consumers are in the best
position to balance the risks that products create to consumers against the
benefits they create for consumers, but courts should not leave to
theory, even if there were no inherent characteristics rle. However, without the inherent
characteristics rule, whiskey and tobacco manufacturers might be liable to consumers for part of the
harm that they cause to consumers. If a jurisdiction applies a consumer expectations test, whiskey
and tobacco would not be defective. If they were found to be defective under a benefit/risk test, the
assumption of the risk/contributory negligence, or comparative fault defenses may limit recovery. See
supra note 39. Cigarette manufacturers might be liable to those who incur diseases due to second-
hand smoke. Manufacturers of alcohol might be subject to liability for the risks that it causes to
bystanders, but this liability might not be too great if responsibility is shared with misusing
consumers.
See infra text accompanying notes 68-164.
"See, eg., 2 ENrERaisE RSPONSIBILrrY, supra note 36, at 48-49.
".d.
"1 See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
" [Vol. 81
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consumers the task of defining the scope of a product manufacturer's
responsibility for injury to bystanders.47
A footnote to the above-quoted portion of the American Law Institute
Reporters' Study states:
This claim [that "tort law should rely on markets to decide what
products should be produced"] assumes that firms internalize risks to
third parties and consequently reflect these risks in prices. Firms are
now required to internalize third-party risks through the bystander
liability doctrine, which allows parties outside the chain of distribution
to sue the manufacturers of defective products.
This argument incorrectly assumes that all bystander losses are internal-
ized under current bystander rules. As the quoted portion of the footnote
states, bystanders may "sue the manufacturers of defective products," but
bystanders generally have no products liability cause of action when they
are injured by a product that is not defective or that is dangerous because
of inherent risks.! The study correctly recognizes that reliance on
consumer choice to determine the optimal level of safety will yield the
correct result only if bystander losses are internalized in the cost of
products," but advocates a rule that would not internalize the costs of
bystander injuries that result from inherent product dangers.5
Manufacturers will internalize the inherent risks of products to
bystanders only if they are subject to liability for these injuries. If
courts or legislatures do not impose liability on manufacturers for
injuries that products cause to bystanders, these injuries become
"external costs," i.e., costs to society that are not reflected in the cost
of the product.52 The argument that manufacturers of dangerous products
should be subject to liability for injuries to bystanders so that these costs will
be internalized is developed in a later sectionY
" It may be that a consumer who uses a product that causes unreasonable risk to a bystander
should be subject to liability, but that should not necessarily relieve the manufacturer of liability to
the bystander. A later section discusses the responsibility of the manufacturer and the misusing
consumer. See infra text accompanying notes 96-100.
"2 ENTERPRISm REsNsInILrY, supra note 36, at 49 n.26.
"Id. (emphasis added).
See infra text accompanying notes 100-06.
"2 ENTERPRis RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 36, at 56.
"On the other hand, the price will reflect the risks to the consumers because, in determining
whether to use a product, the consumers take into consideration the risks that use of the product
creates to themselves.
" See infra text accompanying notes 101-06.
1992-931
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The argument that juries would have difficulty balancing all of the
costs and benefits of a product has merit. As the Reporters' Study
acknowledges, when a jury is asked to apply a cost/benefit analysis
to an entire category of products, it "is asked to act in the same
manner as a well staffed regulatory agency, but without the latter's
perspective, information and expertise."'  Juries may be unwilling to
balance risks to life against dollars, a task that is essential in a
cost/benefit analysis.5 It would be particularly difficult for juries to
calculate the benefits of an entire category of products, because of the
difficulty of determining the value of consumer surplus. 6 Courts
generally should rely on the consumer's judgment that the benefits of
a product outweigh its costs, but courts should ensure that the cost
that consumers consider when purchasing a product includes the risks
that the product imposes on bystanders. Courts could impose the
losses suffered by innocent bystanders on manufacturers of dangerous
products irrespective of whether or not the costs of the product
outweigh its benefits. There would then be no need for the jury to
balance the costs and benefits. Bystander recovery would cause
manufacturers to internalize the costs of that recovery. These costs
would be reflected in the product's market price, leaving the
cost/benefit decision to the consumer. Manufacturers of inherently
dangerous products should not be exempt from liability to bystanders
just because the risks that the products create are inherent.
-, 2 EmRPIusE REsPoNsIBILrrY, supra itote 36, at 53-54. This concern was expressed by Justice
Schreiber of the New Jersey Supreme Court. He dissented from the majority's decision to allow juries
to determine whether the manufacturer of a product could be subject to liability based on the
product's inherent characteristics, "because the jury will not be cognizant of all the elements that
should be considered in formulating a policy supporting absolute liability [and] because it is not
satisfactory to have a jury make a value judgment with respect to a type or class of product ... "'
O'Brien v. Musicn Corp., 463 A.2d 298, 310 (N.J. 1983) (Schreiber, J., dissenting). Justice Schreiber
advocated that the question of whether the manufacturer of a product should be subject to strict
liability for the product's inherent characteristics should be resolved by the court, rather than the jury.
Id. at 312 (citing the REsATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 crt. 1 (1977)). This Article concludes
that manufacturers of dangerous products should be subject to strict liability for injuries to innocent
bystanders, without requiring the plaintiff to show that the product is defective. Justice Schreiber did
not limit his proposal to cases in which bystanders are injured.
"2 ENTERPRISE RESPoNSIBILITY, supra note 36, at 54.
,Consumer surplus is the difference between what consumers pay and what they would be
willing to pay. The price that concerns pay for products does not reflect individual consumers' value
of the product. However, what a consumer is willing to pay for a particular product is typically a
good measure of the product's benefits to the consumer. Understandably, consumer benefit is difficult
to accurately measure. See Alan Schwartz, Proposals for Product Liability Reform: A Theoretical
Syntheis, 97 YALE LJ. 353, 386-88 (1988) (discussing the practical difficulties juries encounter
when attempting to valuate consumer surplus).
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3. The Patent Danger Rule
The patent danger rule has its roots in warranty law and limits
bystander recovery in some strict products liability cases.57 Under
that rule, if the plaintiffs injuries are the result of a dangerous aspect of
the product that is obvious, the manufacturer is excused from liability. 8
The application of the patent danger rule may be justified in a claim
brought by a consumer. If the risk of injury is apparent, the consumer
generally either has been contributorily negligent in failing to notice the
risk or has assumed the risk. Consumers can substantially reduce the risk
to themselves by taking steps for their safety in light of the obvious
risk.59 However, this rule is not justified in a case brought by a bystand-
er who has not behaved negligently, has not assumed the risk and has not
had an opportunity to affect the risk.'e Nevertheless, some courts have
applied the patent danger rule to bystanders.6'
Though the patent danger rule makes sense in cases of consumer
injury, the majority of courts have rejected it in both bystander and
consumer cases,62 based on the argument that it would be unfair to
See, eg., Delvaux v. Ford Motor Co., 764 F.2d 469, 474 (7th Cir. 1985) (denying passenger
recovery for injuries arising from the obvious risks of convertible type automobiles). For a list of
additional recent cases sustaining the viability of the patent danger rule, see Theresa L. Kruk,
Annotation, Products Liability: Modem Status of Rule that There Is No Liability for Patent or
Obvious Dangers, 35 A.L.R. 4th 861, 866-71 (1985 & Supp. 1992).
For general discussions of the patent danger rule, see id.; Stanton G. Darling II, The Patent
Danger Rule: An Analysis and A Survey of its Vitality, 29 MERCER L. REv. 583 (1978); Patricia
Marschall, An Obvious Wrong Does Not Make a Right. Manufacturers' Liability for Patently
Dangerous Products, 48 N.Y.U. L. RLrv. 1065 (1973).
See Marschall, supra note 57, at 1066.
"See Campo v. Scofield, 95 N.E.2d 802 (NJ. 1950); Richard A. Epstein, The Risks of
Risk/Utility, 48 OHIO ST. L.1 469, 474 (1987).
10 See Marschall, supra note 57, at 1110.
The California Supreme Court rcjected the patent danger rule in bystander cases in Pike v.
Frank G. Hough, 467 P.2d 229, 231 (Cal. 1970), emphasizing its unfairness when applied to a
bystander. In Pike, plaintiff's decedent was killed when struck by a paydozer that plaintiff alleged
failed to provide the operator with adequate ability to see behind the vehicle. Id. at 229. The court
explained that
it is not necessarily apparent to bystanders that the machine operator is incapable of
observing them. ... The danger to bystanders is not diminished because the purchaser of
the vehicle is aware of its deficiencies of design. The manufacturer's duty of care extends
to all persons within the range of potential danger.
Id. at 234.
" See Burton v. L.O. Smith Foundry Prods. Co., 529 F.2d 108, 111 (7th Cir. 1976); Schemel
v. General Motors Corp., 384 F.2d 802, 805 (7th Cir. 1967); Stovall & Co. v. Tate, 184 S.E.2d 834,
839 (Ga. Ct. App. 1971); Murphy v. Cory Pump & Supply Co., 197 N.E.2d 849, 854 (Il1. App. Ct.
1964).
" See cases cited in Kuk, supra note 57, at 872-80 & Supp. 77-80.
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relieve the manufacturer of responsibility for an unreasonably dangerous
product. 3 Rejection of the patent danger rule has also been justified on
the grounds that the defenses of contributory negligence and assumption
of the risk take appropriate account of the plaintiffs culpability.'
Richard Epstein advocates the continued application of the patent
danger rule on the grounds that it is a bright line test and it supports
markets and private ordering; if there is no patent danger rule, courts
reevaluate the risk/utility choice of consumers.' It may be that in
products liability cases brought by consumers it is appropriate to rely on
the risk/utility choice of the consumer, but the bystander's recovery
should not be limited just because the dangers are obvious to the
consumer. Imposing liability on the manufacturer for bystander injuries
would support market disciplines by internalizing bystander losses in the
cost of products and the consumer would have to consider the costs that
a product creates to others when deciding whether to purchase it.s
II. BYSTANDER RECOVERY FOR INJURY FROM NONDEFECTIVE
DANGEROUS PRODUCTS
Early in the development of products liability, courts cited Justice
Traynor67 as suggesting that "liability might be imposed as to products
whose norm is danger.""e Courts have not followed this interpretation
" See Luque v. McLean, 501 P.2d 1163, 1169 (Cal. 1972); Micallef v. Miehle Co., 348 N.E.2d
571, 577 (N.Y. 1976).
"See Pike, 467 P.2d at 234.
6S Epstein, supra note 59, at 475. According to Epstein:
The latent defect tests reinforce market disciplines. The risk/utility test is a massive,
if unintended, assault on markets and private ordering, for defendants are now required to
justify independently every decision that they and their customers have made with respect
to a product's use .... [I]t becomes necessary to go behind the consent of consumers
Id. Epstein also supports the patent danger rule because it "gives a clear, cheap, and correct answer
in most cases," whereas the risk/utility test is very difficult to apply. Id. at 474. The difficulty in
applying the riskutility test is certainly a valid concern. However, courts might just as easily impose
strict liability for all bystander injuries that dangerous products cause, and thereby avoid this
difficulty. See infra note 126.
"See infra text accompanying notes 89-121.
,7 Justice Traynor wrote the majority opinion in Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377
P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1963), which adopted strict products liability in California. Justice Traynor first
articulated holding manufacturers strictly liable for injuries caused by their products in Escola v.
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 440-41 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring). This is regarded as
"[t]he most important early judicial effort to articulate a strict form of liability for product-caused
injuries. MARSHALL S. SHApo, THE LAW OF PIODucrs LiABILrry § 7.0112], at 7-3 (2d ed.
1990).
" Jiminez v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 482 P.2d 681, 684 (Cal. 1971) (citing Roger J. Traynor, The
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and generally require that there be a defect in the product. It is appropri-
ate that courts have not imposed strict products liability solely on the
basis of the dangerousness of the product when the injured party is a
consumer,69 but it may be that this limitation should not apply to injured
bystanders.
This section explores whether manufacturers of dangerous but
nondefective products should be subject to strict liability to injured
bystanders. It concludes that courts should impose liability for bystander
injury on manufacturers of dangerous products that are not used by the
vast majority of citizens. The following rationales support this conclusion:
manufacturers and consumers who enjoy the benefits of dangerous
products that are not enjoyed by others expose bystanders to unrecipro-
cated risk; imposing liability would compensate bystanders for their
losses and spread the risk of such injury to the consumers who aid in the
creation of the risk; imposing liability would internalize the cost of
bystander injury in the price of products, encouraging manufacturers to
take cost-justified safety steps and consumers to purchase the cost-
justified number of products. Furthermore, when a bystander is injured by
an inherently dangerous product, abnormally dangerous activity liability
law provides an appropriate precedent for allowing bystander recovery.
A. Fairness and the Bystander
1. Unreciprocated Risk
The concept of unreciprocated risk .may justify extending strict
products liability for bystander injury to manufacturers of dangerous
products that are not used by a substantial portion of the population."0
Professor George Fletcher argued that "a victim has a right to recover for
injuries caused by a risk greater in degree and different in order from
those created by the victim and imposed on the defendant-in short, for
injuries resulting from nonreciprocal risks."'71
Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L. REv. 363, 367 (1965));
Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 455 n.10 (Cal. 1978) (quoting .'iminez, 482 P.2d at 684).
Justice Traynor, however, at the page the court cites, states that the product must be defective. See
Traynor, supra, at 367.
"See Gary T. Schwartz, Forward: Understanding Products Liability, 67 CAL. L. REv. 435, 488-
93 (1979).
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According to Fletcher, there is no compelling logic for imposing
liability in cases of reciprocated risk, when the defendant merely exposes
the plaintiff to a risk that is similar to the risk to which the plaintiff
exposes the defendant. Reciprocated risks are "the background risks that
must be borne as part of group living."'72 In cases of unreciprocated risk,
however, courts should impose liability, based on the rationale that those
who expose others to unreciprocated risk for their own purposes, even if
justified, should pay for losses suffered.7'
Of course, if courts impose strict liability on manufacturers of
dangerous products for bystander injury, then manufacturers will either
pass much of their liability costs to purchasers or discontinue some
product lines altogether. Accordingly, purchasers and potential consumers
will suffer loss because some dangerous products will cost more and
others will no longer be available. It is appropriate, however, that
purchasers and consumers of dangerous products bear some of the
liability costs that dangerous products create, because the purchasers and
consumers of these products, as well as the manufacturers, create
unreciprocated risk to bystanders. 4 This risk should be spread to all who
benefit from the product.
"Id. at 543.
As argued in a later section, the concept of unreciprocated risk is one of the major
justifications for the imposition of strict liability for abnormally dangerous activity. See infra text
accompanying note 129.
7 As to recovery for bystander injury from defective automobiles, Fletcher observes that
the ultimate issue is whether the motoring public as a whole should pay a higher price
for automobiles in order to compensate manufacturers for their liability costs to
pedestrians. The rationale for putting the costs on the motoring public is that motoring,
as a whole, imposes a nonreciprocal risk on pedestrians and other bystanders ....
Fletcher, supra note 70, at 570, quoted in Marschall, supra note 57, at 1075. Fletcher's analysis
would equally apply to bystander injuries from nondefective dangerous products. Accordingly, users
of dangerous products, who impose on bystanders an unreciprocated risk, would absorb the costs of
liability as manufacturers pass this cost on to them. As for automobiles, they are so common within
our society that almost everyone benefits from them; therefore, the unreciprocated risk theory
probably does not justify the imposition of strict liability for all injuries caused to bystanders by
automobiles.
Patricia Marschall suggests that the unreciprocated risk theory justifies imposing strict liability
on manufacturers for injuries arising from all products, on the ground that the manufacturer is also
exposing the consumer to an unreciprocated risk. Marschall, supra note 57, at 1074. Such an
extension, however, fails to account for the fact that consumers are exposing themselves to the risk
as much as the manufacturer.
As the above quote illustrates, Fletcher's concept of unreciprocated risk is not inconsistent with
risk spreading. When a group of consumers creates an unreciprocated risk to another group, liability
should be imposed, and the risk spread to the consumers. Manufacturers and consumers of guns,
cigarettes and alcohol and other dangerous products that a significant portion of the population does
not use expose others to unreciprocated risk. Therefore, both consumers and manufacturers should
bear the costs of such unreciprocated risks. For a discussion of risk spreading, see infra text
accompanying notes 79-88.
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Some of the losses created by dangerous products occur because of
irresponsible use on the part of consumers. For instance, the greatest
danger to bystanders from alcohol occurs when consumers drink and
drive. Likewise, the greatest danger to bystanders from guns occurs when
criminals use them for illegal purposes. Some might argue that it is unfair
to impose on responsible users the costs created by irresponsible users.
A later section discusses the responsibility of the misusing consumer
and argues that manufacturers should have an indemnity cause of
action against the highly culpable consumer.75 This leaves pressure
on the consumer to use products responsibly. The misusing consumer,
however, is often unable to reimburse the manufacturer, and if
liability is imposed on manufacturers, they will pass much of the
unreimbursed liability costs to responsible consumers. Despite this
seeming inequity, however, it is appropriate that responsible consum-
ers share some of the cost of bystander injury since they create the
demand for dangerous products.
The strongest case for liability based on unreciprocated risk is one
in which the bystander has never used the dangerous product that
causes the injury. In that case, the bystander has not helped to create
the risk that has caused his or her injury and has not exposed others
to such a risk. In such cases, the manufacturer and consumers have
exposed the bystander to an unreciprocated risk.
Although injured bystanders who have never used a particular
product present the strongest case for bystander recovery based on
unreciprocated risk, it does not necessarily follow that bystanders who
have used a product should be denied recovery.76 Bystanders who use
the product contribute to the funds used to pay bystander liability
costs when they purchase the product. Furthermore, their degree of
contribution is directly proportional to the amount of purchases that
they make.' Bystanders who have been heavy users of the product
would have made substantial contributions to the funds that manufac-
n See infra text accompanying notes 95-100. That section also discusses the economic effect of
imposing liability on manufacturers for bystander injuries. See infra text accompanying notes 101-06.
" In one type of bystander cause of action, prior bystander use would create another problem.
Bystanders in second-hand smoke cases would, of course, bear the responsibility of showing that
their loss was caused by the second-hand smoke and not by any tobacco that they had smoked. This
might create a substantial barrier for plaintiffs who occasionally smoke or who have smoked in the
past, but the barrier is created by the causation requirement, not by their responsibility for creating
risk to others. For a discussion of the possibility of a second-hand tobacco cause of action, see infra
text accompanying notes 140-45.
" This risk spreading argument could, of course, be extended to justify recovery by consumers




turers use to pay liability costs. Bystanders who use the product only
occasionally create much less of the risk and contribute less to the
liability fund. Besides, a rule denying recovery to bystanders who had
used the product would be difficult to implement because it would be
difficult, in many cases, to identify plaintiffs that had used a product.
2. No Benefit from the Product or Any of Its Cost Savings
Bystander recovery may also be justified because manufacturers,
purchasers and consumers benefit from dangerous products, and they
do so at the expense of bystanders that are placed at risk. In the early
days of strict products liability, some courts justified consumer
recovery on the ground that manufacturers had made the product in
order to generate profit, i.e., for their own benefit.78 In cases brought
by consumers, a weakness in this argument is that consumers, as well
as the manufacturers, benefit from the product. Manufacturers and
consumers are on an equal footing in this respect because both benefit
from the product that caused the injury. However, the early courts'
benefits reasoning does apply when dangerous products injure
bystanders, since bystanders have generally not benefited from the
product that caused their injury. Manufacturers, purchasers and
consumers bear some responsibility for bystanders' injuries because
each has enjoyed the benefits of the product and, in doing so, has
placed the bystander at risk.
The argument that courts should provide preferential treatment to
bystanders, who have not benefited from the product, over consumers
is even more compelling in the many cases in which the manufactur-
ers and consumers have benefited from the very aspects of the product
that make it dangerous. Dangerous products often cost less to
produce. Assume, for example, that a manufacturer of a power boat
fails to install an expensive stopping mechanism. Some of these
savings will result in higher profits for the manufacturer and, under
pressure of a competitive market, others will be passed on to the
consumer in the form of a lower product price. Hence, the manufac-
turer gets higher profits and the consumer pays less for the product
because the product is more dangerous. This arrangement is fair
enough if consumers are merely exposing themselves to risk. It is
unfair, however, for manufacturers and consumers to benefit from
' See, e.g., Suvada v. White Motor Co., 210 N.E.2d 182, 186 (Il1. 1965).
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risks to which they expose bystanders, unless they also compensate
bystanders for their losses.
B. Spreading the Risk of Bystander Injuty: Court-Imposed Third
Party Insurance
If courts impose liability on manufacturers for product injury to
any group of plaintiffs, manufacturers will raise the price of the
product and spread the risk of the loss to purchasers.79 Justice
Traynor of the California Supreme Court offered risk spreading as a
justification for strict products liability in what is widely regarded as
the first opinion to propose strict products liability: "The cost of an
injury and the loss of time or health may be an overwhelming
misfortune to the person injured, and a needless one, for the risk of
injury can be insured by the manufacturer and distributed among the
public as a cost of doing business."8 This justification for imposing
strict products liability has been adopted by many courts."1
The theory of risk spreading recognizes that strict products
liability works in some respects like an insurance system. That is, if
courts impose liability for product injury, manufacturers will raise the
cost of the product. All consumers, therefore, pay a bit more for the
product. This additional amount acts like an insurance premium.
When people are injured, their losses are covered. Those who favor
risk spreading argue that it is better for many consumers to bear a
small loss than for those who are injured to suffer a devastating
loss. 2
" The risk spreading argument is not divorced from the unreciprocated risk argument made
previously. See supra text accompanying notes 70-77.
Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 441 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring).
tSee eeg., Lippard v. Houdaille, Indus., 715 S.W.2d 491, 502 (Mo. 1986); Beshada v. Johns-
Manville Prods. Corp., 447 A.2d 539, 546 (N.L 1982); Allen v. Heil Co., 589 P.2d 1120, 1126 (Or.
1979).
Guido Calabresi justifies risk spreading with the following arguments:
(a) that taking a large sum of money from one person is more likely to result in
economic dislocation, and therefore in secondary or avoidable losses, than taking a series
of small sums from many people, and (b) that even if the total economic dislocation is the
same, many small losses are preferable to one large one, simply because people feel they
suffer less if 10,000 of them lost $1 than if one loses $10,000.
While the first of these propositions is an empirical generalization not too difficult to
accept, the second is in its precise terms a variant of the economist's theory of the
diminishing marginal utility of money.




There are difficulties with the argument for spreading the risk of
consumer injuries. 3 For instance, if courts consistently followed risk-
spreading theory, there would be almost no limits to strict liability; that
is, liability would be imposed in almost any suit brought against an
enterprise.' Expanded products liability would limit consumer choice in
several ways. Manufacturers would withdraw some products from the
market because production would no longer be profitable. Manufactur-
ers would add "insurance premiums" to the price of other products,
resulting in higher prices. Consumers who would prefer to pay lower
prices and assume the risk of injury or to rely on their own insurance
plans would be unable to do so. Furthermore, some consumers would
be unwilling to pay higher prices and poor consumers might be
unable to pay higher prices."5 Although it might be argued that
consumers need the protection of the insurance system that strict
liability imposes, this argument is excessively paternalistic. Consum-
ers should be able to choose whether to purchase this protection.
The argument for spreading the risk of bystander injury from
dangerous products is stronger than the argument for spreading the
risk of consumer injury. When courts impose liability for consumer
injury, they impose on consumers a first party insurance system, a
system that provides compensation to the payor (the first party) when
the payor is injured. When they impose liability for bystander injury,
they impose on consumers a third party insurance system, a system
that provides compensation to others (the third parties) when they are
injured.
The paternalism objection to spreading the risk of consumer injury
(courts should not impose on consumers the duty to protect themselves) does
not apply to bystander injury. When courts impose liability for bystander
" See Howard C. Klemme, The Enterprise Liability Theory of Torts, 47 COLO. L. RFv. 153,
191-92 n.107 (1976); David G. Owen, Rethinking the Policies of Strict Products Liability, 33 VAND.
L. REv. 681, 703-07 (1980).
" In almost all situations, a commercial enterprise will have a better ability to spread the risk
than an individual plaintiff. Manufacturers will have a better ability to spread the risk, whether or not
the product is defective, since the liability expense will be added to the cost of the product.
This concern with risk spreading's boundless expansion of strict products liability may have
caused Justice Traynor to emphasize other justifications for strict products liability in Greenman v.
Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1963), which adopted strict products liability in
California. Likewise, several courts have taken pains to emphasize that strict products liability is not
absolute liability and that under strict products liability the manufacturer is not the insurer of those
injured by the product. See, e.g., Daly v. General Motors Corp., 575 P.2d 1162, 1166 (Cal. 1978);
Cronin v. J. B. E. Olson Corp., 501 P.2d 1153, 1162 (Cal. 1972); Dippel v. Sciano, 155 N.W.2d 55,
63 (Wis. 1967).
' See James M. Buchanan, In Defense of Caveat Emptor, 38 U. CHI. L. REv. 64 (1970).
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injury, they are requiring consumers to purchase third party insurance to
protect others from the losses caused by consumers' use of dangerous
products. Bystanders do not have the same opportunities to protect
themselves from product risks. Whereas consumers can purchase
insurance in light of the risks created by the products that they use,
bystanders are likely to undervalue or be unaware of the risk that other
people's products pose to them.s Even if bystanders know of the risks
that dangerous products create, 7 bystanders should not have to pay for
the risks created for the consumers' benefits"
C. Safety, Efficiency, and Internalizing the Cost of Bystander Injury
One reason that courts often give for imposing liability on manufac-
turers is that to do so will encourage the production of safer products. 9
This section explores the effects that imposing liability for bystander
injury upon the manufacturers of dangerous, nondefective products would
have on safety and efficiency.
Professor Calabresi has argued that to yield both the greatest level of
safety and the highest level of efficiency obtainable from a liability rule,
liability should be imposed on the person that can avoid the loss at the
cheapest cost." As to safety, the argument is that a rational, profit-maximiz-
ing party, on whom courts impose liability, will incorporate the safety
precaution as long as the safety cost is less than the accident cost.9 The
' See Note, Strict Liability and the Bystander, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 916, 935 (1964); Note, Strict
Products Liability to the Bystander: A Study in Common Law Determinism, 38 U. CHI. L. REv. 625,
638 (1971).
" For instance, bystanders are likely to know of the risk of injury from guns in high crime areas
and from drunk driving on the highways.
" An analogy can be drawn to legislative proposals to require individuals to purchase health
(first party) insurance and proposals to require them to purchase automobile liability (third party)
insurance. Whereas requiring individuals to purchase health insurance is subject to continuing debate,
almost all jurisdictions require individuals to purchase automobile liability insurance. See Ian Ayers
& Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficency and the Optimal Choice of Legal Rules, 101
YALn L.J. 729, 744 n.54 (1992).
See, eg., Phillips v. Kimwood Machine Co., 525 P.2d 1033, 1041 (Or. 1974).
,o See Guido Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for Harry Kalven,
Jr., 43 U. CHI. L. REv. 69, 84-85 (1975).
" In the case of consumer injury, there has been a substantial debate as to whether the cheapest
cost avoider is generally the manufacturer or the consumer. Some argue that consumers who are
informed of the risks of a product generally will be the cheapest cost avoiders, because they can use
the products in a safe manner and the costs of safe use may be much less for the consumer than the
costs of a different design for the manufacturer. See Buchanan, supra note 85, at 71-72; Roland N.
McKean, Products Liability: Trends and Implications, 38 U. CI. L. REv. 3, 24-56 (1970). Others
argue that the manufacturer has greater expertise than the consumer and is generally better able to
calculate the costs and benefits of safety steps. See Guido Calabresi & Kenneth C. Bass III, Right
Approach, Wrong Implications: A Critique of McKean on Products Liability, 38 U. CHI. L. REv. 74,
1992-93]
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cheapest cost avoider is, by definition, the party for whom the safety cost
would be the least.92
As for maximizing efficiency, imposing liability on the cheapest cost
avoider will yield the lowest sum of accident costs and safety costs.93
The cheapest cost avoider determines whether the safety costs are worth
the savings in liability costs. Imposing liability on the cheapest cost
avoider will not lead that party to adopt all safety measures-no liability
system could do that-but it will encourage the cheapest cost avoider to
create only cost-justified risks."'
Safety and efficiency generally justify imposing liability on the
manufacturer for bystander injury, because the manufacturer will
generally be a cheaper cost avoider than a bystander. Bystanders
generally are not in a position to take steps to avoid injuries arising from
dangerous products. Bystanders are merely engaged in the activity of
ordinary life, and would have to cease normal activity to avoid risks
created by dangerous products.95 Manufacturers, on the other hand, have
some control over safety. They can market products more safely, take
care to sell to those that will use products safely, and wage campaigns to
76-89 (1970).
Though Calabresi has suggested that manufacturers are generally the cheapest cost avoiders, see
id., he and Professor Hirschoff have argued that courts should determine in each case who is the
cheapest cost avoider and irirpose liability on that party. Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward
a Test for Stict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE Li. 1055, 1060 (1972). However, as Patricia MarschalU
has argued:
Although theoretically appealing, the test is impractical and inefficient because of the
difficulties involved in locating the best decisionmaker. Judges and juries are not trained
to draw multibranched decision trees. To compare the decision-making abilities of a
manufacturer at one point in time with those of a consumer at another raises questions too
complex and uncertain of outcome for the real world of negotiation and trial practice. The
Calabresi and Hirschoff system would necessitate more lawyer, judge and jury hours to
settle or try each case. Its extreme flexibility would make predictions of trial outcomes
more speculative than under existing tests of strict liability. Its adoption therefore would
result in more trials and fewer settlements.
Marschall, supra note 57, at 1101. This, of course, is the objection that Epstein and others raise to
the benefit/risk design defect test. See supra note 65 and text accompanying note 47. This Article
proposes that manufacturers of abnormally dangerous products be subject to liability for bystander
injury, without requiring plaintiff to show either defect or that the manufacturer is the cheapest cost
avoider, and thereby avoids the difficulties of an indeterminate rule. In most cases, this would be
consistent with the cheapest cost avoider theory, because as between a bystander and the
manufacturer, the manufacturer will almost always be the cheapest cost avoider. See infra text
accompanying notes 94-95.
Calabresi, supra note 90, at 84-85.
"Id. at 84.
"Of course, an administrative regulation or criminal law could demand higher (and inefficient)
levels of protection.
" Cf. RicHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 140-41 (2d ed. 1977) (suggesting that
this argument justifies abnormally dangerous activity strict liability).
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encourage safer product use. If the costs of bystander loss are sufficiently
great, a manufacturer can avoid the risk of loss by ceasing to manufacture
a product.
While as between the manufacturer and the bystander, the manufac-
turer is likely to be the cheaper cost avoider, the consumer may often be
the cheapest cost avoider.96 The consumer can often reduce the risk to
bystanders at a very small cost by using the product more carefully. For
example, consumers can use guns with greater care and only for
legitimate purposes, they can smoke cigarettes only when they are alone,
and they can consume alcohol only when they are at home or are being
chauffeured. Likewise, blasters can use explosives in ways that are less
likely to cause injuries to others. When the consumer is the cheapest cost
avoider, to the extent possible courts should impose costs of bystander
injury on the consumer. Courts already allow bystanders to recover
against consumers who are negligent97 and consumers who engage in
abnormally dangerous activity."s
Unfortunately, however, users of dangerous products may not be
affected by the risk of liability. For instance, the risk of tort liability has
little effect on those that use guns for criminal activity. Likewise,
cigarette smokers are likely to believe that the risks created by the little
bit of smoke that they blow in the direction of others is too trivial to
cause any injury.99 Consumers of alcohol may not be the rational, profit-
maximizers posited by economic theory; some are addicted, and the
judgment of those that have had even one or two drinks may be impaired.
In addition, the risk of liability may not affect those consumers who
would be unable to pay for losses to injured bystanders.
Courts must continue to maintain pressure on consumers to use
products in a safe manner, but they can do so without denying bystander
recovery from manufacturers. Courts can maintain consumer accountabili-
ty while allowing bystanders to recover from manufacturers for injuries
caused by dangerous products by giving manufacturers an indemnity
cause of action against consumers who could have avoided the loss at a
cheaper cost.e
"See discussion supra note 91.
See KETON Er AL., supra note 13, §§ 30-33.
"See id. § 78.
As to bystander injuries that result from the cumulative effect of exposure to a dangerous
product's use by numerous consumers, such as cancer from second-hand smoke, injured bystanders
would be unable to bring suit against all of the consumers who have caused their loss and would
have substantial problems proving cause in fact.
" In an indemnity cause of action, a party who has paid a judgment is reimbursed in full by
another party. See KEnToN Er AL, supra note 13, § 51, at 341.
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If courts impose liability on manufacturers of dangerous products for
injuries to bystanders, manufacturers will internalize the cost of bystander
injury. In other words, manufacturers will choose the most efficient
combination of safety steps and price increases in order to cover
bystander loss, and the price paid by the consumer for the product,
through some combination of increased safety costs and liability costs,
will reflect the bystander's loss.
Before looking at the effect that internalizing bystander losses will
have on the safety of products, consider how the free market, through
bargaining, provides pressure toward the efficient level of protection for
consumers, irrespective of whether courts impose liability on manufactur-
ers for consumer injury. If consumers are informed of the risks created
by products, they will take into consideration the risk of accidents to
themselves as a part of the cost/benefit determination that they make
when they purchase products. They internalize those risks. Unlike
bystanders, consumers have the ability to take steps for their safety; they
can purchase safer products, purchase products only from reputable
manufacturers, or bargain for what they perceive to be the appropriate
level of safety. The market, therefore, encourages manufacturers to
produce products that have the most efficient level of consumer safety,
i.e., products that provide what consumers believe to be the best
combination of consumer safety and cost savings. Whether courts impose
liability for consumer injury on the manufacturer or leave losses with
consumers may not have a great effect on product safety.'
There is, however, no possibility of bargaining between the manufac-
turer and the bystander, and, therefore, bargaining cannot lead to the
efficient result. The free market, by itself, provides no incentive for
manufacturers or consumers to consider the safety of bystanders. If courts
did not impose liability on either consumers or manufacturers for injury
to bystanders, those costs would be external costs, i.e., the price of the
product would not reflect the risk to bystanders. Accordingly, manufactur-
ers would not take those costs into consideration when deciding what
safety steps to take or when setting the price of a product, and consumers
would not take these costs into consideration when purchasing or using
a product.
When courts impose liability on manufacturers for injuries to bystanders
resulting from manufacturer negligence or from defective products, it forces
the manufacturer to internalize the risk of these injuries; hence, the safety and
price of products reflect these risks. When courts impose liability on
10 This argument is developed in 1 ENTEMISE REMPONSIBILrrY, supra note 36, at 398-402.
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consumers for injuries to bystanders resulting from their negligence or
their use of abnormally dangerous products, this internalizes the risk of
many of these bystander injuries; the potential liability is reflected in the
price that the consumer is willing to pay for the product.
The current system of manufacturer liability for defective products
and consumer liability for consumer negligence and abnormally danger-
ous activity does not internalize all of the risks to bystanders. Hence,
there is no incentive for manufacturers to consider risk to bystanders from
products that are not defective, and there is no incentive for consumers
to consider risk to bystanders from products that they do not use
negligently or in abnormally dangerous activity. Manufacturers will
overproduce and consumers will overuse products that create risks to
bystanders. Consider, for example, the risk of injury to bystanders in
hunting accidents. Assuming that the gun is not defective and there is no
negligence on the part of the party using the gun, injured bystanders get
no recovery. The consumer need not consider the risk of nonnegligent
injury to bystanders when deciding to purchase a gun. If liability were.
imposed on the manufacturer for such accidents, the cost of the gun
would reflect this added risk.
In addition to the fact that, unless liability is imposed, consumers
need not consider the risks of nonnegligent injury to bystanders when
making purchases, there is also a great danger that consumers will not
give sufficient consideration to the risk that they will cause negligent
injury to bystanders. They are unlikely to care as much for the bystander's
safety as they care for their own."°2 Some consumers will simply
overlook the risks that their activity will cause to others. Even a
consumer who considers the risk of liability is not as likely as a
manufacturer to be affected by it, since consumers are not as likely as
manufacturers to be able to pay the damages of a seriously injured
victim. 0
3
If courts impose liability on manufacturers for bystander injury,
manufacturers will internalize the risk in the cost of the product. They
will take additional safety steps and/or raise the price of the product in
light of bystander risks.' ° Manufacturers will not take every possible
' There is, of course, an argument that consumers will not give adequate consideration to the
risks that products will create to themselves. However, consumers are generally the best judge of
whether the benefits of a product outweigh the risks to themselves. See Epstein, supra note 59, at
475.
" See Philip M. Kinkaid & William J. Stunte, Note, Enforcing Waivers in Products Liability,
69 VA. L. Rev. 1111, 1137 (1983).
I" As Judge Adams of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals said in a case extending strict liability
for defective products to manufacturers for bystander injury:
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safety step, but will instead determine the combination of safety costs and
liability costs that will yield the least overall cost.
To the extent that they can do so, manufacturers will pass these
costs, whether liability or safety costs, to consumers. The price of
products will more accurately reflect the costs that the products create
to society, and consumers will be forced, through the higher prices,
to take into consideration the losses that products cause.' 5 If the
price of a product goes up so much that the price exceeds its value to
a consumer, it will not be purchased; its costs to society are greater
than the benefits that it provides. Consumers are making a cost/benefit
decision every time they purchase a product, and if the market is to
work efficiently, the costs of the product should reflect the risks to
bystanders, as well as the other costs of the product."6
Though including the cost of bystander injuries in the price of a
product would aid the cause of efficiency, it would also create
inefficiencies of its own. Some inefficiencies accompany any system
of products liability. Inefficiencies arise when courts impose products
liability on manufacturers of durable goods because consumers pay
liability costs on a per purchase basis, rather than a per use basis. As
argued above, one goal of spreading the risk to purchasers of products
is that the price of the product includes the costs the product will
impose on society; 7 then the consumer can make the cost-justified
choice. However, if the risk of liability is to have the most efficient
impact on safety, courts should impose liability on a per use basis
rather than a per sale basis, because risk is created by each use of the
product, rather than each sale.' With respect to durable goods,
when liability costs are spread on a per purchase basis, the cost
imposed will not reflect the risk that each purchaser creates;0  each
purchaser pays the same liability "premium" with the purchase, but
Inasmuch as the defective product may well injure persons who have not purchased the
product or in any way dealt with the manufacturer, there is no price mechanism by which
to insure such persons against the risk of loss. ... The imposition on manufacturers of
strict liability for defective products accomplishes the cost internalization that the price
mechanism cannot achieve by placing the complete cost of the injuries on the manufactur-
er.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 626 F.2d 280, 288 (3d Cir. 1980). His
argument is equally applicable to bystander injuries from nondefective products.
" See Howard C. Klemme, The Enterprise Liability Theory of Torts, 47 U. CoLO. L. RLrv. 153,
158-61 (1976).
I" See infra text accompanying notes 109-13.
117 See supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text.
'" See Henderson & Twersid, supra note 6, at 1312.
.. Id. at 1313-14.
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those who use the product less often subsidize those who use the product
more often."'
James Henderson and Aaron Twerski argue that when the law leaves
losses on injured users and consumers, this market distortion is avoided:
"[T]he substantial majority of individual product users and consumers
who cannot prove the existence of a defect generally do bear accident
costs roughly in proportion to their levels of product usage and their
contributions to the risks of injury.'. If courts do not impose liability
on the manufacturer for consumer injury, the risk of loss is placed on the
consumer on an efficient, per use basis. Note, however, that this
efficiency exists only as to risks to "consumers and users."". Though
consumers and users have an incentive to consider the risk that product
use creates to themselves on a per use basis, they have no such incentive
to consider the risk that the nonnegligent use of products creates to
bystanders."'
Imposing liability on manufacturers of dangerous products for injuries
to bystanders would create some distortion, because the risk of loss from
dangerous durable products (such as firearms) would be spread to
consumers on a per purchase rather than a per use basis. This distortion,
however, may be less than the distortion under the current system, in
which consumers have no incentive to avoid the nonnegligent use of
products that create risk to bystanders. Courts might impose strict liability
for bystander injury on consumers of dangerous products, and thereby
impose on them "accident costs roughly in proportion to their levels of
product usage and their contributions to the risks of injury,""' 4 but this
would fail to spread the risk of bystander loss as under a manufacturer
liability system. In cases in which both durable and nondurable dangerous
products cause a loss, courts could impose liability on the manufacturer
of the nondurable product, and thereby spread the risk of bystander loss
to consumers on a per use basis. For example, courts could impose
liability for bystander injuries from firearm accidents on bullet manufac-
turers rather than gun manufacturers.
Imposing liability on manufacturers also creates additional distortions,
"what economists .refer to as 'second best' problems: targets of burden-
"' See id. Note that this distortion is not as great with nondurable goods. For example, if courts
impose liability on manufacturers of cigarettes for consumer injury, as manufacturers spread the risk
to consumers, the consumer would pay a liability "premium" with each use of the product.
" Id. at 1313 (emphasis added).
. See Id.
The risk of liability would, of course, create an incentive to safely use products if the
consumer normally engaged in negligent conduct.
"' Henderson & Twersid, supra note 6, at 1313.
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some governmental regulation, when possible, will seek to escape the
burdens by substituting unregulable (and in this context, possibly riskier)
modes of behavior.""' For example, imposing liability on manufacturers
of durable products encourages consumers to use older (and possibly
more dangerous) products."' Imposing liability on manufacturers also
encourages the development of unregulable black markets."' Henderson
and Twerski suggest that if courts imposed liability on manufacturers for
injuries caused by nondefective products, black markets would develop
and create a great increase in the number of injuries from contaminated
tobacco and alcohol products."'
Of course, the degree to which an expansion of products liability will
create "second best" problems, such as the continued use of used products
and the development of black markets, will depend on the amount of the
increase in costs that increased liability will create. Henderson and
Twerski criticize arguments in favor of imposing liability on manufactur-
ers of nondefective products for consumer and bystander injury on the
basis that such liability would raise the price of products substantially and
create significant "second best" problems."" The possibility discussed
in this Article of imposing liability on manufacturers for bystander injury
would have a much smaller impact on the price of most products than
across-the-board manufacturer liability, because most products cause
substantially fewer bystander injuries than consumer injuries. 2 ' The
,n Id. at 1310.
,I, Henderson and Twerski also argue that this would encourage the development of markets for
used products that would not bear the "tax' of the new products. Id. at 1290. However, the cost of
used products would go up as demand increased.
"' See id. at 1289. These "second best' problems, of course, can occur whenever products
liability is expanded or any type of product safety regulation is adopted.
"Id. at 1312.
, Id. at 1310-14.
" Consider a few examples that Henderson and Twersi discuss. Id. at 1312. Henderson and
Twerski suggest that imposing liability on manufacturers of cigarettes for injuries to consumers would
cause a $2 to $3 increase in the cost of a pack of cigarettes and argue that if all injured parties could
recover from cigarette manufacturers, "black-marketeering is inevitable." Id. at 1311 n.176. The
impact of bystander recovery for second-hand tobacco smoke injury, however, would have a much
smaller impact on tobacco prices. Whereas tobacco causes approximately 300,000 consumer deaths
a year, Donald W. Garner, Cigarettes and Welfare Reform, 26 EMORY L.1 269, 271 (1977) (citing
HAROLD S. DIm., TOBACCO AND YouR HEALTH: THE SMOKiNG CoNTROVERSY 33-34 (1969)), it
causes only between 2,490 and 5,160 bystander deaths each year, David B. Ezra, Note, Smoker
Battery: An Antidote to Second-Hand Smoke, 63 S. CAL. L. Rav. 1061, 1065 (1990).
Approximately one-third of the 23,000 people killed each year in alcohol-related traffic deaths
are bystanders. Compare DOROTHY P. RicE Fr AL., THE ECONOMIC Cosrs OF ALCOHOL AND DRUG
ABUSE AND MENTAL ILLNESS: 1985, 118 (1990) (finding that in 1985 alcohol consumption caused
23,190 traffic deaths) with Willard G. Manning et al., The Taxes of Sin: Do Smokers and Drinkers
Pay Their Way?, 261 3. AM. MED. Ass'N 1604, 1608 (1989) (finding that 7400 of those killed in
alcohol related accidents in 1985 had not consumed alcohol) (citing U.S. DEPT. OF TRANSPORTATION,
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distortions that might be created by imposing liability for bystander injury
would probably be minor compared with the distortions that currently
exist when no liability is imposed for bystander injury.'
D. Abnormally Dangerous Activity Liability as Precedent for Bystander
Recovery
As a previous portion of this Article demonstrated, warranty law has
had a great impact on the development of strict products liability in
tort." Warranty law may be the proper precedent when a purchaser or
consumer is injured since the suit is between those who benefit from the
transaction. But when a dangerous product injures a bystander, abnormal-
ly dangerous activity liability is probably the more appropriate prece-
dent.'2
Under abnormally dangerous activity liability, defendants are subject
to strict liability for damages caused by their dangerous and in some way
unusual activity. 4 Though the defendant who engages in an abnormally
NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFmrY ADMINISTRATION: DRUNK DRIVING FACrS 23 (1986)).
A higher percentage of those killed by other dangerous products, such as handguns, may be
bystanders. If courts allowed bystander recovery and the legislature found that the distortion as to
some products was too great, it could exclude their manufacturers from liability.
"' See supra text accompanying notes 101-06.
Henderson and Twerski acknowledge that bystander losses create market distortions, noting that
"to the extent that smoking and drinking generate externalities or involve addictive behavior, society
confronts potentially significant market failure," but they suggest that courts leave this problem to
the legislature. Henderson & Twerski, supra note 6, at 1330. Legislatures are unlikely, however, to
pay much attention to bystanders. The plight of bystanders that are injured by any one product is
unlikely to generate much public interest. Advocacy groups may attempt to limit the use of dangerous
products such as alcohol or tobacco, but these groups have not advocated recovery for injured
bystanders. Therefore, if the risks of bystander injury are to be internalized in the price of dangerous
products, it is likely that this will have to be the work of the courts. If the distortions created by
bystander recovery are so great respecting some products that exemption from liability is justified,
the legislatures could create an exemption for such products.
" See supra text accompanying notes 15-66.
Though abnormally dangerous activity liability has not had as great an impact on strict
products liability law as warranty theory, it has had some impact. The Restatement (Second) of Torts
adopts the abnormally dangerous activity rle concerning contributory negligence: "Since the liability
with which this Section deals is not based upon negligence of the seller, but is strict liability, the rule
applied to strict liability cases (see § 524 [the abnormally dangerous activity section]) applies."
REsrATEmENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. n (1977).
John L. Diamond, Eliminating the "Defect" in Design Strict Products Liability Theory, 34
HASTNGs W. 529, 531 (1983), suggests that courts might extend abnormally dangerous activity
liability to impose liability on manufacturers of nondefective dangerous products in cases involving
all categories of injured parties. However, as argued infra at text accompanying notes 129-33,
traditional strict liability is bystander liability. Extension of abnormally dangerous activity strict
liability to all categories of plaintiffs would go far beyond its present limitations.
See, aeg., Rylands v. Fletcher, 3 L.R.-E.&I. App. 330, 338 (H.L 1868); RESrATEMENT
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dangerous activity may have acted reasonably, the defendant's activity
must pay its way." At the trial of an abnormally dangerous activity
case, the court decides as a matter of law whether an activity is subject
to strict liability. 126
(SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 519, 520 (1977); KEarON Er AL., supra note 13, § 78, at 551. Section 520
of the Restatement states:
In determining whether an activity is abnormally dangerous, courts are to consider the
following factors:
(a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land or
chattels of others;
(b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great;
(c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care;
(d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage;
(e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on; and
(f) extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its dangerous
attributes.
RESrATEmENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (1977).
I d. § 519 cmt. d (1977).
"u Comment I to section 520 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides:
Function of court. Whether the activity is an abnormally dangerous one is to be
determined by the court, upon consideration of all the factors listed in this Section, and
the weight given to each that it merits upon the facts in evidence. . .. This calls for a
decision of the court; and it is no part of the province of the jury to decide whether an
industrial enterprise upon which the community's prosperity might depend is located in
the wrong place or whether such an activity as blasting is to be permitted without liability
in the center of a large city.
Id. § 520 cmt. 1.
Likewise, in a bystander's cause of action based on the danger presented by a product, the court,
rather than the jury, might determine whether the manufacturer of a product is subject to liability. The
court might impose liability if it determines that the product creates unreciprocated risks to a
substantial portion of the population. This would avoid the difficulties that arise in the ordinary
design defect case in which the jury must determine whether a product is defective. It is very difficult
for a jury to apply a risk/benefit test. They must compare risks (such as the danger of death) and
benefits (such as efficiency) that are very difficult to compare. See supra note 65 and accompanying
text. People differ greatly in the way that they draw a risk/benefit analysis and the jury will often be
second-guessing a balance that was drawn by the customer who purchased the product. See supra
note 65 and accompanying text. Different juries are likely to reach different results with the same
facts. It is therefore difficult for manufacturers to predict when they will be subject to liability for
a product's design.
The proposal for bystander recovery suggested herein is in some respects like that suggested
by Justice Schreiber of the New Jersey Supreme Court. He suggested, in a case in which the plaintiff
was injured when he dived into an above-ground swimming pool, that a court might find, based on
the Restatement's abnormally dangerous activity factors, see supra note 124, that the manufacturer
of a product should be subject to strict liability for the inherent dangers of a product. See O'Brienv.
Muskin Corp., 463 A.2d 298, 312-13 (N.J. 1983) (Schreiber, J., concurring). Justice Schreiber is
critical of the majority in O'Brien for allowing the jury to determine whether the manufacturer of a
product should be subject to liability based on the product's inherent characteristics. Id. He advocates
that the judge determine whether a nondefective product should be subject to strict liability, as in the
abnormally dangerous activity cases. Id. at 314-15. Justice Schreiber's proposal differs from that
advocated herein in that he would allow liability when there is injury to consumers, as well as
bystanders. Dangerous products cases are substantially more similar to dangerous activity cases when
BYSTANDER RECOVERY
Abnormally dangerous activity liability is bystander liability. As the
Alaska Supreme Court explained in imposing abnormally dangerous
activity liability on defendants for the storage of explosives, "[a]s
between those who have created the risk for the benefit of their own
enterprise and those whose only connection with the enterprise is to have
suffered damage because of it, the law places the risk of loss on the
former."' 27 In this respect, manufacturers and consumers of dangerous
products are like defendants in the abnormally dangerous activity cases.
Manufacturers and consumers of dangerous products benefit from the
production of the products and it may be that they should be responsible
to bystanders who are injured by such products.
Commentators have differed over the justification for abnormally
dangerous activity strict liability.' George Fletcher argues that liability
is based on fairness in that the defendants in such cases expose others to
unreciprocated risk.'29 Other commentators justify abnormally dangerous
activity liability based on economic efficiency: 3' the defendant is
generally the cheapest cost avoider in such situations, because plaintiffs,
who are merely engaged in the ordinary activities of life, would find it
difficult to adjust their lives to avoid abnormal risks.' Defendants can
more easily make cost-justified changes in their activities to avoid the
risks. A third group of commentators suggest that compensation and risk
spreading justify abnormally dangerous activity liability.' Previous
a bystander is injured than when a consumer is injured.
,' Yukon Equip., Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 585 P.2d 1206, 1212 (Alaska 1978). Similarly,
comment d to section 519 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts states that, abnormally dangerous
activity liability "is founded upon a policy of the law that imposes upon anyone who for his own
purposes creates an abnormal risk of harm to his neighbors, the responsibility of relieving against that
harm when it does in fact occur." RESrATEmENr (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 cmt. d (1977).
Accordingly, courts deny recovery to those who engage in the abnormally dangerous activity. See
id.
I It appears that the early cases, such as Rylands v. Fletcher, 3 L.R.-E.&I. App. 330 (H.L.
1868), were based on the unexpected nature of the risks. In England at that time, people expected
to be exposed to risks from mining operations, but not from water held in artificial ponds. See id. at
338.
, Fletcher, supra, note 70, at 543-56. Fletcher maintains that "[i]f uncommon activities are those
with few participants, they are likely to be activities generating nonreciprocal risks." Id. at 547.
Professor Fletcher also sees unreciprocated risk as the underlying basis for the law of intentional torts
and negligence. See id. For a discussion of the unreciprocated risk justification for liability, see supra
text accompanying notes 70-77.
'" Se4 e.g., POSNER, supra note 95, at 140-41.
.. See id.; Steven Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J. LEG.AL STUD. 1, 24 (1980).
. See Charles 0. Gregory, Trespass to Negligence to Absolute Liability, 37 VA. L. REv. 359,
395 (1951); Virginia E. Nolan & Edmund Ursin, The Revitalization of Hazardous Activity Strict
Liability, 65 N.C. L. REv. 257, 292-93 (citing Chavez v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 413 F. Supp.
1203, 1208 (E.D. Cal. 1976)). For a discussion of the risk spreading rational, see supra text
accompanying notes 84-94. Risk spreading, however, does not explain the limitations of
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sections of this Article have found support in each of these justifications
for a bystander cause of action against manufacturers of dangerous
products. 33
The economic justification for a bystander cause of action against
manufacturers of nondefective dangerous products is not as strong as that
against the party that engages in the dangerous activity, because generally
the party that engages in the dangerous activity will be the cheapest cost
avoider. For example, users of dynamite or alcohol are probably the
parties that can most easily take steps that would make their activities
safe. As argued above," 4 however, as between the manufacturer and the
bystander, the manufacturer is most likely to be the cheaper cost avoider,
and courts can maintain pressure on users by giving manufacturers a right
of indemnity against users.
The Restatement (Second) of Torts lists the "extent to which the
activity is not a matter of common usage" as one of six factors that can
justify imposing abnormally dangerous activity strict liability.'35 Of
course, many products that expose bystanders to risk, such as cigarettes,
alcohol and firearms, probably are "matter[s] of common usage." Though
the Restatement does not require that an activity be "not a matter of
common usage" before it is subject to liability, it may be that even
including this trait as a factor for the courts to consider could lead a court
unjustifiably to deny recovery. Abnormally dangerous activity's
unreciprocated risk justification would suggest the need to impose
liability for a broader range of dangerous activities. If a substantial
portion of the population does not benefit from an activity, those who
engage in the activity expose others to an unreciprocated risk. In some
cases, for instance, courts have extended dangerous activity liability to
crop-dusting, even though it was a common activity in the area in which
the defendant engaged in it. 3' Under this broader view of abnormally
ultrahazardous activity liability. Indeed, if a court were to build a liability system around risk
spreading, it is difficult to see any limits to the liability of an enterprise for injures that it causes. See
Owen, supra note 83, at 704.
.. See supra text accompanying notes 70-77 (unreciprocated risk argument), 79-88 (risk
spreading argument), and 89-121 (cheapest cost avoider argument).
"4 See supra text accompanying notes 94-95.
REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520(d) (1977); see supra note 124.
... See, eg., Lee v. Lenhardt, 362 P.2d 312, 316-18 (Or. 1961); Langan v. Valicopters, Inc., 567
P.2d 218, 223 (Wash. 1977). The Restatement states that the manufacture of explosives is "carried
on by only a comparatively small number of persons and therefore [is not a matter] of common
usage." RmATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 cmt. i (1977). This appears to be inconsistent with
the Restatement's argument, within the same comment, that automobiles are not subject to strict




dangerous activity strict liability, courts might impose strict liability on
activities (and on manufacturers of dangerous products) that do not
benefit a substantial portion of the community.
With a few exceptions,'37 courts have not applied abnormally
dangerous activity liability to manufacturers of dangerous products."
' See, eg., Chapman Chem. Co. v. Taylor, 222 S.W.2d 820, 827 (Ark. 1949) (holding creation
of pesticides that caused injury to plaintiff'scotton to be an ultrahazardous activity); see also Andrew
0. Smith, Note, The Manufacture and Distribution of Handguns as an Abnormally Dangerous
Activity, 54 U. Cm. L. REV. 369, 384-85 (1987) (discussing Chapman and other cases that suggest
that the manufacture of some dangerous products might be subject to ultrahazardous activity liability).
The comments to the Restatement can be read to suggest that a manufacturer might be subject
to abnormally dangerous activity liability. For instance, comment i to section 520 argues that "the
manufacture, storage, transportation and use of high explosives" are carried on by a small number
of persons, and therefore are uncommon activities subject to strict liability. RESrATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 520 cmt. i (1977). The comment, however, may merely suggest that if the explosives
go off during manufacture, the manufacturer will be subject to liability.
"3 Some courts have limited abnormally dangerous activity liability to dangerous activity on the
defendant's land. See, eg., Kelley v. R.G. Indus., 497 A.2d 1143, 1147 (Md. 1985) (refusing to
impose liability unless the activity is abnormally dangerous with respect to the place where it occurs);
Yommer v. McKenzie, 257 A.2d 138, 141 (Md. Ct. App. 1969) (discussing the critical importance
of an activity being abnormally dangerous with respect to its surroundings). Contra Chapman Chew.
Co. v. Taylor, 222 S.W.2d 820, 827 (Ark. 1949) (holding that the frequency of aerial spraying of
pesticide in a given location does not warrant finding the activity not extrahazardous); Loe v.
Lenhardt, 362 P.2d 312, 316-18 (Or. 1961) (holding aerial spraying extrahazardous activity in a
community where widely used); Langan v. Valicopters, Inc., 567 P.2d 218, 221-23 (Wash. 1977)
(holding defendant liable for damage resulting from the common practice of crop-dusting); Siegler
v. Kuhlman, 502 P.2d 1181, 1184-85 (Wash. 1972) (holding defendant liable for injuries sustained
from gasoline trailer overturning despite a finding that hauling gasoline in that manner is not
unusual), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 983 (1974). Comment e to section 520 of the Restatement (Second)
explicitly rejects a limitation of abnormally dangerous activity liability to activities that occur on
defendant's land. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 cmt. e (1977). Both the Blackburn (lower
court justice) and the Cairns (appellate court justice) opinions in Rylands v. Fletcher, 3 L.R.-E.&I.
App. 330 (H.L. 1868), state their rule in terms of defendant doing something on his land. Blackburn
imposes liability on the person who "brings on his lands ... any thing likely to do mischief," 143
Rev. Rep. 611, 621 (Ex. Ch. 1866), and Cairns imposes liability on defendants whose "use of their
close" is "non-natural," 3 L.R.-E.&I. App. 330, 339 (H.L. 1868). The language in each of the
opinions may have merely described the activity of the defendant in Rylands, rather than stating a
requirement of the rule adopted.
The Restatement states that the "inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried
on" is a factor to be considered in determining whether an activity is subject to strict liability.
R.SIATEMENr (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520(e) (1977). Dangerous products, of course, create risks in
any place that consumers might use them. Two recent Washington Supreme Court decisions,
purporting to apply the Restatement, appear to ignore the "inappropriateness to the place" factor. The
Washington Supreme Court found the hauling of gasoline, Siegler v. Kuhlman, 502 P.2d 1181, 1184-
85 (Wash. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 983 (1974), and crop-dusting in an area where crop-dusting
was prevalent, Langan v. Valicopters, Inc., 567 P.2d 218, 221 (Wash. 1977), to be ultrahazardous.
In those cases, the court found the activity to be ultrahazardous, in spite of the fact that roads seem
to be the appropriate place to haul gasoline and a valley where crop-dusting occurs seems to be the
appropriate place to crop-dust. Virginia Nolan and Edmund Ursin argue that these cases ignore the
last three factors of section 520 of the Restatement, see supra note 124, and stand "for the
proposition that the Restatement (Second) is not the proper focus for strict liability analysis." Nolan
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The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit refused to extend
abnormally dangerous activity liability to the manufacture of handguns in
part because of a fear that this would create too great a burden on
manufacturers of dangerous products. According to the court, such an
extension "would require that manufacturers of guns, knives, drugs,
alcohol, tobacco and other dangerous products act as insurers against all
damages produced by their products."'39 As suggested above, however,
the abnormally dangerous activities rule justifies manufacturer liability
only in cases of bystander injury. The extent of liability that such a rle
would create would not be as great as that suggested by the Seventh
Circuit because most of the risks that knives, drugs, alcohol, tobacco and
other dangerous products create are to consumers.
The basis of abnormally dangerous activity liability is that those who
engage in dangerous activity for their own benefit should pay for losses
that they cause to bystanders; the activity should pay its way. It may be
that likewise, manufacturers (and through them consumers) who benefit
from dangerous products should pay for losses that such products cause
to others.
E. Dangerous Products that Create Risks to Bystanders
Previous portions of this Article have suggested that fairness and
efficiency may justify bystander recovery from the manufacturers of a
dangerous product if there is a substantial portion of the population that
does not benefit from the product. This section will briefly consider the
causes of action that bystanders might bring against the manufacturers of
cigarettes, alcohol and firearms.
1. Second-Hand Tobacco Smoke
Many consumers have tried to recover for diseases caused by tobacco,
but so far they have generally been unsuccessful. 4 ' Smokers, and the
& Ursin, supra note 132, at 274-78.
Other courts have refused to apply abnormally dangerous activity liability to manufacturers of
dangerous products because they do not consider the production of products to be an activity. See,
e.g., Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 762 F.2d 1250, 1265 n.43 (5th Cir. 1985); Martin v. Harrington &
Richardson, Inc., 743 F.2d 1200, 1204 (7th Cir. 1984).
"' Martin, 743 F.2d at 1204. This argument echoes William Prosser's justification for products
liability's inherent characteristics rule. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
"' See Mary Griffin, Note, The Smoldering Issue in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.: Process
Concerns in Determining Whether Cigarettes are a Defectively Designed Product, 73 CORNELL L.
REV. 606, 606 n.2 (1988).
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beneficiaries of their estates, will find little help in the cause of action
suggested herein. Smokers obviously are consumers, not bystanders.
Those who are injured because of second-hand smoke, however, may be
able to recover under a bystander theory.'
Cigarette manufacturers would be subject to liability under the
rule suggested herein because cigarettes are dangerous and a substan-
tial portion of the population does not smoke. Recent studies provide
clear evidence that second-hand smoke causes lung cancer to
bystanders. 4 ' One study found that 2,490 to 5,160 nonsmokers a
year die as a result of second-hand smoke. 43 "[T]he percentage of
American adults that smoke declined from 42% in 1967 to 32% in
1987."'" Manufacturers and those who smoke cigarettes expose a
significant number of people to unreciprocated risk. It may be that
tobacco manufacturers (through liability) and consumers (through
higher prices) should be responsible for the risks that they cause to
others.
It is especially important for victims of second-hand smoke that
courts adopt the cause of action suggested herein. Whereas many
bystanders who are injured by dangerous products can bring suit
against the users of the products that cause their injury under a
negligence or abnormally dangerous activity theory, victims of
second-hand smoke have no such option. Typically, they have been
subjected to a lifetime of second-hand smoke by many smokers.
Responsibility for this loss might be placed on manufacturers and
spread to all smokers through higher prices. It will, of course,
generally be impossible to identify one manufacturer who is responsi-
ble for a second-hand smoke injury, but this may be an appropriate
case for courts to apply market share liability. 45
" Cf. Ezra, supra note 120, at 1085-1100 (arguing that involuntary smokers should be able to
recover damages under a battery cause of action); Bradley M. Soos, Note, Adding Smoke to the Cloud
of Tobacco Litigation-A New Plaintiff. The Involuntary Smoker, 23 VAL. U. L. REv. 111, 128-44
(1988) (arguing that an involuntary smoker should be able to recover from a manufacturer under the
enterprise theory of tort liability); Morley Swingle, Comment, The Legal Conflict Between Smokers
and Nonsmokers: The Majestic Vice Versus the Right to Clean Air, 45 Mo. L. REV. 444, 474-75
(1980) (predicting a revival of product liability actions by nonsmokers for injury caused by second-
hand smoke as evidence of the dangers of second-hand smoke increases).
"' A recent Environmental Protection Agency report found that second-hand smoke accounted
for 3,000 lung cancer deaths a year. Steven Long, Smoking up a Storm, HoustoN CRONICLE, Jan.
7, 1993, at Al. The Agency also announced that it would classify second-hand smoke as a "Class
A" carcinogen, which includes such substances as benzene, asbestos and arsenic. Id.
.' See Ezra, supra note 120, at 1065.
I Id. at 1062 (citing "No Smoking" Sweeps America, Bus. WK., July 27, 1987, at 40).
145 Under market share liability, a manufacturer is liable for a pro rata share of the plaintiff's




The Department of Transportation estimates that in 1985, 7,400
people who were not drinking were killed in alcohol-related automobile
collisions.' One-third of American adults do not consume alcoholic
beverages.'47 Courts might impose responsibility for these injuries on
the manufacturers of alcohol, which would result in higher prices for
consumers. Such liability could be based on the unreciprocated risk that
those who consume alcohol pose to those who do not.
Additional characteristics of alcohol create additional justifications for
imposing liability on manufacturers for bystander injury. Whereas the
consumer of most products has an opportunity to make a reasonable
risk/benefit calculation before using a product, alcohol diminishes the
consumer's reasoning ability, both in the short-run and the long-run.
Consumers of alcohol are subject to diminished marginal reasoning
ability. They may initially intend to consume only a few drinks, but after
a few drinks they are likely to believe that they can consume a few more.
In addition, alcohol is addictive, and addicts require higher and higher
doses to satisfy their addiction, creating even greater risks of drunk
driving and injuries to bystanders.
Traditionally, courts did not impose liability on those who negligently
served excessive amounts of alcoholic beverages.'" They found the
intoxicated driver to be a superseding cause of the loss.'49 In recent
years, however, courts have recognized that it is not only the drinker that
is responsible for his or her intoxicated condition.'50 Accordingly, courts
have increasingly imposed liability on bars and social hosts on the basis
that it is negligent to serve excessive amounts of alcohol to one who
might foreseeably cause injury.'
The Restatement (Second) of Torts takes the position that defendants
that engage in abnormally dangerous activity should be subject to liability
even if the harm is also caused by the activity of a negligent or reckless
third person.52 As in the alcohol server cases and the abnormally
607 P.2d 924, 937 (Cal. 1980).
"' U.S. Dom,. oF TRANSPORTATION, NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFc SAFETY ADMINISTRATION:
DRUNK DRVNG FACrS 23 (1986), cited in, Manning, supra note 120, at 1608.
See Elizabeth M. Whelan, To Your Health, 25 AcRoss THE BOARD 49, 49 (1988).
, See John R. Ashmead, Note, Putting a Cork on Social Host Liability: New York Rejects a
Trend, 55 BROOKLYN L. Rv. 995, 997 (1989).
10 See id.
... See id. at 1002-04.
.. See, eg., Klein v. Raysinger, 470 A.2d 507, 510 (Pa. 1983) (listing recent cases that have
imposed liability on bars and social hosts).
"' RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 522 (1977).
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dangerous activity cases, it may be that the foreseeable culpability of the
intervening misuser should not prevent the manufacturer of alcoholic
beverages from being held liable to injured bystanders.
3. Firearms
Guns are another class of dangerous products that cause injury to a
substantial number of bystanders. The Maryland Court of Appeals
recognized a cause of action that is similar in some respects to the
proposal discussed herein, when it allowed an innocent bystander injured
during the commission of a crime to recover from the manufacturer of a
"Saturday Night Special" handgun. 53 The court held that abnormally
dangerous activity liability did not apply because the activity did not
occur on the defendant's land," and that strict products liability did not
apply because the risk of injury from crime is one of the inherent risks
of these guns."5 The court did, however, adopt a new strict liability
cause of action on the grounds that the risks of "Saturday Night Specials"
outweigh their benefits to society, their criminal use is foreseeable, and
as between a totally innocent victim and the manufacturer that makes a
product that will be used most commonly in criminal activity, the
manufacturer is more at fault.' Others have advocated such a cause of
action against the manufacturers of automatic assault weapons.5 7 Under
the cause of action discussed herein, bystanders injured in hunting
accidents might also obtain a recovery, because guns for hunting are
dangerous products that are not used by a substantial portion of the
population.
Manufacturers of guns will argue that guns serve important functions
in society. For instance, guns can be used for self-protection. Imposing
liability on manufacturers of guns would raise the price of guns for those
who want to use them for self-protection, as well as for those who want
to use them for pleasure and criminal activities. The cheap "Saturday
Night Special," for which the Maryland Court of Appeals created a strict
liability cause of action, may be the only weapon that some people can
afford.
" Kelley v. 1LG. Indus., 497 A.2d 1143, 1159 (1985).
" Id. at 1147.
"4 Id. at 1149.
"4 Id. at 1154-59; see also Smith, supra note 137, at 384-85 (arguing that manufacturers of
handguns should be subject to abnormally dangerous activity liability).
1"7 See Joshua M. Horwitz, Kelley v. R.G. Industries: A Cause of Action For Assault Weapons,
15 U. DAYTON L. REv. 125, 138-39 (1989).
1992-93]
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Under the Restatement's abnormally dangerous activity liability rule,
in determining whether to apply strict liability, the court considers the
benefits the activity provides to the community as well as its risks.'
The court is to consider external benefits, i.e., benefits beyond those
provided to the one who engages in the activity. Arguably, guns provide
benefits to the community beyond the benefits that they provide to
individual consumers. The awareness that there is a risk that they may be
shot by someone who has a gun probably helps to deter some prospective
criminals from committing crimes. It may be that the added cost to guns
that bystander liability would create would deter more law-abiding
citizens than criminals from owning guns. The drafters of the Bill of
Rights protected the right to bear arms'59 because they saw guns as a
protection against an overintrusive government. 6 If courts use the
Restatement's abnormally dangerous activity rule as a guide in bystander
dangerous product cases, they might find that the benefits of guns tip the
scale in favor of not imposing liability.
A bystander who is injured by a gun during the commission of a
crime may face an additional difficulty in recovering from the manufac-
turer. In these cases, there is a highly culpable intervening actor-the
criminal. As noted in the prior section, the Restatement (Second) of Torts
takes the position that plaintiffs should be subject to abnormally
dangerous activity liability even if the harm is also caused by the activity
of a negligent or reckless third person.' The Restatement, however,
explicitly takes no position as to whether an intervening actor who
intends to cause harm should cut off liability.' Many courts have held
that an intervening criminal actor cuts off liability in negligence
cases. 6 If manufacturer liability is cut off by an intervening intentional
tortfeasor, this would deny recovery to many who are injured by guns
used in criminal activity.
If courts impose liability on gun manufacturers, courts could maintain
whatever pressure the risk of tort liability places on criminals by giving
the manufacturer an indemnity cause of action against the misusing
consumer.'" Furthermore, imposing liability on the manufacturer would
"3 RESrATEMSNT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (1977).
"3 U.S. CoNsrT. amend. II.
"3 See Martin v. Harrington & Richardson, Inc., 743 F.2d 1200, 1204 (7th Cir. 1984) (refusing to
find handgun manufacture to be an ultrahazardous activity, based in part on the Illinois Constitution's
protection of the right of private citizens to bear arms).
"' RESrATEMLNT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 522 (1977). See supra text accompanying note 152.
162 Id.
... See KEETON Er AL., supra note 13, § 33, at 201, § 44, at 313.
'" See Smith, supra note 137, at 377-79.
[Vol. 81
BYSTANDER RECOVERY
encourage manufacturers and sellers to see that guns are not purchased
by persons that are likely to commit crimes." 5
CONCLUSION
It may be that when there is a substantial portion of the population
that does not benefit from a dangerous product, the manufacturer should
be subject to strict liability for injuries to injured bystanders. The cost of
liability would ultimately be passed on to consumers in the form of
higher prices, but it is appropriate that those who benefit from dangerous
products pay a bit more so that injured bystanders-who do not benefit
from the product-may be compensated. The price of dangerous products
should include the losses that they cause to bystanders.
165 See id.
1992-93]

